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JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal of a final order of the Utah Labor Commission issued on 
January 14, 2008. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988) and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(8)(2003). 
ISSUES ON REVIEW 
1. Whether the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
his work accident is the legal cause of his ongoing neck complaints. 
2. Whether the Labor Commission's review of the record to evaluate legal 
causation improperly reconsidered medical causation. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 34A-2-401, Utah Code Annotated, provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104, who is 
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for the loss sustained on account of 
injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(I) medical, nurse and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner (hereinafter "Verburg") filed an application for hearing seeking an 
award of workers' compensation benefits related to two alleged industrial accidents, on 
March 24, 2004 and again on June 17, 2004, during his employment with Ogden City 
Police Department. (R. Vol. 2 at 1-2). 
A hearing was scheduled before the Labor Commission on April 26, 2005. The 
hearing was continued to June 7, 2005 on motion of Respondents. (R. Vol. 2 at 26-30). 
An Administrative Law Judge of the Labor Commission (hereinafter "ALJ") held 
a hearing in this matter on June 7, 2005. At the hearing, Verburg withdrew his claim 
for an accident on March 24, 2004, but proceeded to present evidence related to the 
alleged industrial accident of June 17, 2004. (R. Vol. 3). 
On June 17, 2004, Verburg struck the right side of his head while getting into a 
patrol car to remove his belongings at the end of his shift. (R. Vol. 3 at pp. 11-13, 25). 
The parties agreed that Verburg had a preexisting condition that contributed to 
the injury of June 17, 2004 and that there was a medical causal connection between 
the June 17, 2004 incident and Verburg's complaints of increased neck pain thereafter. 
(R. Vol. 3 at 6, 7). However, the parties disputed whether the evidence was sufficient to 
satisfy the legal causation requirement of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986)1. 
]
 R. Vol. 3 at 7. Petitioner's argument regarding legal causation is somewhat 
unclear. On the one hand, he seems to argue that the higher legal causation 
requirement should not apply to accidents which are an "unexpected occurrence." 
However, petitioner never raised such an argument before the commission. The dispute 
herein is whether the exertions of Verburg's accident satisfy the higher legal causation 
standard under Allen. 
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The ALJ issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on October 
6, 2005. She concluded the evidence showed that Verburg struck his head with 
sufficient force to satisfy the higher legal causation standard under Allen. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 
37-43) 
Respondents (hereinafter "Ogden City") filed a Motion for Review on October 27, 
2005, alleging that the ALJ's legal causation analysis was incorrect and her conclusions 
were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 44-53). 
The Labor Commissioner reviewed the record in this matter and concluded that 
the evidence did not show the exertion involved in Verburg's accident was enough to 
prove legal causation. The commission denied Verburg's claim. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 59-62). 
Verburg filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 5, 2007. (R. pp. 63-
70). The commission denied Verburg's Motion for Reconsideration on January 14, 
2008(R. pp. 80-82). 
Verburg filed a Petition for Review in this Court on February 13, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Verburg worked for Ogden City as a Community Service Officer. (R. Vol. 3 at 
10). 
2. Verburg has a medical history of "headaches, most likely muskuloskeletal," since 
March 1997 (R. Vol. 2 at 87); and cervical disc disease with surgical work up on 
December 2, 2002 (R. Vol. 2, at 22-24, 232). He received a cervical fusion at 
C5-6 and C6-7 on December 10, 2002 by Dr. Bryson Smith. (R. Vol 2. at 25-27). 
He also has a history of opiate dependency and detoxification treated at Ogden 
Regional Medical Center in 2000. (R. Vol. 2 at 46). 
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3. On January 8, 2004, Verburg saw Dr. James Rhee for evaluation of "persistent 
upper back pain," aggravated by exercise, that had become worse over the past 
two months. (R. Vol. 2 at 195-196). He was treated with pain medications, 
epidural steroid injections, which did not improve his symptoms, and physical 
therapy, which he did not attend. (R. Vol. 2 at 196-198). He also escalated his 
analgesics beyond Dr. Rhee's recommendations. Accordingly, Dr. Rhee 
discharged Verburg from his care. (R. Vol. 2 at 198). A cervical myelogram on 
April 5, 2004 showed multilevel degenerative disc disease. (R. Vol. 2 at 43-44). 
4. Dr. Brent Felix performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion to treat 
Verburg's persistent neck pain on April 19, 2004. (R. Vol. 2 at 54-56). 
5. On May 4, 2004, Dr. Felix indicated that he would release Verburg to return to 
work at light duty on May 19, 2004. In follow up on June 8, 2004, Verburg 
requested that Dr. Felix release him to regular duty with the understanding that 
he would continue sedentary work duties, and "would not be required to go into 
the field and be at risk of trauma to his neck." Zanaflex, a muscle relaxant, was 
prescribed at that visit. Verburg's physician refilled his Lortab prescription on 
June 17, 2004 by telephone. (R. Vol. 2 at 57). 
6. Verburg testified that he hit the right side of his head on the door frame of his 
patrol car at the end of his shift on June 17, 2004. He was not knocked 
unconscious, but reported that his vision "went black for a couple of seconds." 
(R. Vol. 3 at 11-12). The accident report indicates the accident occurred at 5:45 
p.m. (R. Vol. 1 at 11). Verburg explained that he was facing the front of the 
vehicle, went to sit down in the seat and "as I went down, that's when I hit." (R. 
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Vol. 3 at 25). He did not twist. Id- at 26. Verburg testified that his symptoms 
$e<ja<A about au Uou<; ot two afte<; the K\cldec\t- !4- at 13,24. Vecbunj testified 
that he had pain in the center of his neck and pain radiating into the shoulders. 
He said was concerned that he might have disrupted his fusion, id. at 16, 24. 
Verburg testified that he went to McKay Dee Hospital after he reported the 
incident to his sergeant, id- at 17. Verburg testified that he provided all the 
details of the accident to the medical providers and testified that he told the 
medical providers that his vision went black when he hit his head. id. at 22. 
7. The medical records indicate that Verburg's first post-accident medical visit 
occurred on June 29, 2004. Id. At 59. The record reflects that on an unknown 
date, likely after June 17, 2004 and before June 29, 2004, he called Dr. Felix to 
request "stronger med b/c he hit head." The request for stronger medications 
was denied, id. 
8. Verburg saw Dr. Felix on June 29, 2004 "because he hit his head on the garage 
door and hit his head getting into his car." X-rays showed no problems or 
disruption of the fusion. 30 Percocet were prescribed. (R. Vol. 2 at 59). 
9. Verburg saw Physician's Assistant Schelling at Ogden Clinic on July 2, 2004. 
The history indicates that Verburg hit the right side of his head on a car. The 
examination note indicates "+ local tenderness at the left scapular reqion muscle. 
Radiates to L postferior] occipital region along the scap/traps." Impressions were 
chronic neck pain, DJD and muscle spasms. The PA offered muscle relaxants, 
put Verburg declined them. "Pt only wanted pain meds." (R. Vol. 2 at 138-139). 
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10. Verburg reported the June 17 incident to his employer on July 5, 2004 and was 
sent to the Emergency Room. The Employers' First Report of Injury indicates 
that the head bumping accident occurred on June 17, 2004 at 5:45 p.m. (R. Vol. 
1 at 11). 
11. Verburg went to the Emergency Room at McKay-Dee Hospital on July 5, 2004 
with a complaint of neck pain. "He states that two weeks ago he hit his head 
getting in his police car. Since that time he has had pain in his (sic) back of his 
neck as well as on the right side of his head." He was diffusely tender at the 
posterior cervical spine. X-rays of the neck revealed no acute findings, but did 
show signs of effusion. He was diagnosed with a cervical strain, given a 
prescription for 20 Percocet and advised to use ice, stretching and exercise. (R. 
Vol. 2 at 1-3). 
12. Verburg returned to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room on July 9, 2004 
with complaints of ongoing neck pain. The history indicates that Verburg "re-
injured his neck while climbing into his squad car approximately two weeks ago. 
He struck his head. . . he is out of the Percocet and needs additional pain 
medications." On examination, "His posterior cervical spine is not significantly 
tender to palpitation in the midline, rather laterally in the musculature." He was 
diagnosed with an acute exacerbation of chronic neck pain and given another 
prescription for Percocet. (R. Vol. 2 at 5-6). 
13. Verburg returned to Dr. Felix on July 13, 2004. He reported that "he was doing 
quite well until he hit his head on a car and now he has similar pain to what he 
has had previously prior to surgery. He localizes the pain mostly down in the 
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lower cervical area near the C-7-T-1 area. He has been taking Percocet, four 
per day, these are the 10 mg tablets." Dr. Felix concluded that Verburg simply 
continued to have pain, and recommended physical therapy and pain 
management. (R. Vol. 2 at 59). 
Verburg saw FNP Creager at Nowcare of Ogden on July 31, 2004. He reported 
a history of hitting his head on a patrol car in June and now his pain is worse 
than before his first fusion. The pain was described as a "deep burn on the left 
side of his neck that is worse than before." He complained of an "overall 
headache that he has had for quite some time," with nausea. An MRI was 
scheduled and 24 Percocet given. (R. Vol. 2 at 85-86). 
On August 10, 2004, Verburg returned to see Dr. Felix. The doctor indicated that 
Verburg continued to localize his pain to the C7-T1 area. X-rays showed 
instrumentation in good position with no evidence of loosening or migration. 
However, Verburg continued to complain of pain. Dr. Felix recommended pain 
management, physical therapy and a cervical MRI scan. Percocet was refilled. 
(R. Vol. 2 at 61). Dr. Felix completed a Physician's First Report of Injury, but the 
questions regarding medical causation were left blank, id- at 63. 
On August 13, 2004, Verburg saw Dr. Matthew Pingree for evaluation of his neck 
pain. Dr. Pingree noted a history of an anterior cervical fusion in April 2004. "He 
apparently reports that he had no pain for 7 weeks after surgery and was not 
taking any pain medications. On the 17th of June 2004 he hit his head on his 
patrol car at work and ever since has had a return of bilateral neck pain now 
instead of just on the left side. He did not lose consciousness however he did go 
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blank for one second and this has gotten progressively worse. He went to the 
emergency room that day and on one other occasion. He reports he has pain 
100% of the time." (R. Vol. 2 at 179-180). The x-rays performed on August 26, 
2004 were reviewed and compared to prior films. They were read to show no 
misalignment or evidence of instability. (R. Vol. 2 at 53). 
There is a consensus among the physicians who have examined Verburg that 
the increase in Verburg's complaints of neck pain is medically causally related to 
the incident of June 17, 2004. R. at 13, 232. However, the parties dispute 
whether the exertions of the employment satisfied the higher legal causation 
requirement under Allen. 
The Administrative Law Judge correctly noted that the question to be addressed 
was whether the petitioner "carried his burden of proving legal causation." She 
reasoned that: 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the 
direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing 
position to sitting position while propelling his body with such 
a force that when he struck his head his vision went black, 
was not a typical exertion experienced by men and women 
in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor 
vehicle is typical of modern non-employment life, such 
exertion does not typically involve the combination of factors 
presented here. Specifically, the continuous movement of 
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact 
of Petitioner's head and neck on the door jam which was 
unusual or extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of 
legal causation. This extra exertion served to offset the 
preexisting condition of Petitioner as the likely cause of the 
injury. Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and after the 
(sic) June 17, 2004, evidences the degree of force exerted 
by Petitioner. Following surgery in April 2004, Petitioner felt 
better than before the surgery and was happy with the result. 
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However, following June 17, 2004, Petitioner experienced 
significantly increased pain in his cervical spine. 
Finally, in concluding that that (sic) facts of Petitioner's injury 
satisfied the higher legal causation standard, it is the duty of 
the Labor Commission to construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee 
coverage when statutory terms reasonably admit of such a 
construction. 
(R. Vol. 1 at 41). 
Ogden City filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ's order, asserting that the ALJ 
incorrectly analyzed the evidence regarding legal causation and incorrectly 
applied a liberal construction standard to her analysis of the facts and the law. 
Ogden City asserted that the preponderance of the evidence did not support the 
ALJ's conclusion that the accident of June 17, 2004 was a compensable 
industrial accident. (R. Vol. 1 at 44-53). 
The Commission granted Ogden City's Motion for Review and denied Verburg's 
claim for lack of legal causation. Upon review of the available evidence, the 
commission concluded that the accident of June 17, 2004 was "a relatively 
routine event in which Verburg bumped his head while getting into the drivers 
seat." The commission was unconvinced that Verburg's testimony that his vision 
went black could reasonably be used to show the force of the impact. Although 
the commission recognized that there are circumstances in which a head bump 
could satisfy the higher legal causation standard, the facts presented in this case 
do not establish that the exertion involved in Verburg's accident was unusual or 
extraordinary. The commission reversed the ALJ's decision and denied 
Verburg's claim. (R. Vol. 1 at 59-62). 
9 
21. Verburg filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Labor Commission. He 
asserted that the commission's Order misapplied the "Allen test" and improperly 
reconsidered medical causation. (R. Vol. 1 at 63-70). 
22. The commission issued an Order Denying Request for Reconsideration on 
January 14, 2008. In sum, the commission concluded that the accident event 
itself was a relatively routine event in which Verburg hit his head as he was 
sliding into the drivers seat. The commission concluded that Verburg's vision 
going black was an atypical response to a typical exertion, rather than 
persuasive evidence that the force involved in the accident was greater than 
typical non-employment life. (R. Vol. 1 at 80-81) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act." Color Country Mqmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, p. 16, 38 
P.3d 969. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) provides that the appellate courts may 
grant relief to a party who has been "substantially prejudiced" by an agency that "has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Whether the Labor Commission has 
erroneously applied the Allen legal causation requirement, however, is a mixed 
question of law and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness and rationality. Acosta v. 
Labor Comm'n etaL 2002 UT App 67 , P. 11, 44 P.3d 819, 822 (internal citations 
omitted). 
The correction of error standard of review does not apply to this case. The 
appellate Court applies a correction of error standard to review the commission's 
interpretation of the law. See Acosta, 2002 UT App 67 P 10. However, in this matter, 
10 
Verburg requests that the Court of Appeals review the commission's application of the 
law to the facts. 
Petitioner asserts that the rule of liberal construction of the Workers' 
Compensation Act subjects Labor Commission decisions that deny benefits to a 
"heightened degree of oversight" on appeal, citing Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor 
Comm'n.,153 P.3d 179 (Utah 2007). However, Salt Lake City Corp. addressed the 
applicability of the coming and going rule to a police officer who was involved in a traffic 
accident while she was driving her police car home. While such "heightened oversight" 
is appropriate to determine whether to bring an injured worker under the protection of 
the Worker's Compensation Act, such heightened scrutiny should not apply in this 
matter, which is a challenge to the commission's evaluation of the evidence regarding 
legal causation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The petitioner had a long history of neck and shoulder pain for which he 
underwent cervical fusion surgeries in 2002 and again in 2004. His complaints of neck 
pain originally began without any inciting event. He had headaches and pain into his 
shoulders and arms that were refractory to conservative medical care. 
He was surgically fused at C5-6 and C6-7 in December 2002. He underwent a 
second cervical fusion surgery at C4-5, on April 19, 2004. He was released to return to 
work at full duty on June 8, 2004. Shortly after his return to work, he hit his head on the 
doorframe of his patrol car. The evidence shows that he was simply getting into his 
vehicle and coincidental^ hit his head on the car. 
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Verburg testified that his vision went black for a couple of seconds, but there 
was no immediate pain. None of the contemporaneous medical reports indicate that 
Verburg's vision "went black" after he bumped his head as he testified at the hearing. 
The vision symptom is first mentioned in the medical records in August 2004. Verburg 
was not knocked out or knocked down as a result of the incident. He was not 
responding to an emergency. 
Verburg did not seek medical care or take time off work related to increased 
neck pain until 15 days later. He waited 18 days to report the incident to his employer 
as a workers' compensation accident. The medical records show that Verburg 
continued to receive prescriptions for muscle relaxants and narcotic pain medicines, 
after he returned to work, although he testified that he was pain free up until the June 
17, 2004 accident. 
There is no dispute that there is a medical causal connection between the June 
17 accident and the complaints of increased neck pain. However, because Verburg 
had a preexisting contributing condition, Utah law requires that he prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the incident on June 17, 2004 legally caused his 
injury. To meet his burden, Verburg "must show that his employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). The 
burden of proof to show a causal connection is by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Allen at 23, citing Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979). 
Petitioner asks this Court to construe the Allen decision to not apply to unusual 
reactions to usual events. He likens his bump on the head while getting into his patrol 
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car to a traffic accident, a trip and fall down stairs, or a slip and fall to the ground. 
These types of accidents are easily distinguished from Verburg's minor accident. 
Verburg essentially argues that if a fall down stairs is compensable, then a bump 
on the head must also be compensable. However, the higher legal causation 
requirement is intended to distinguish between those accidents that coincidentally occur 
at work and those in which the employment contributes more to cause the injury than 
"typical" non-employment activities. When one compares the examples of "typical" 
non-employment activities provided in Allen, such as lifting a small child to chest height, 
lifting and carrying luggage for travel and changing a flat tire on an automobile to 
Verburg's bump on the head, it is easy to see that his incidental bump on the head did 
not involve the type of exertion, or force to the body, needed to satisfy the legal 
causation requirement. 
Verburg claims that because his vision went black for a moment, the bump to 
his head was a more significant contributor to his injury than his pre-existing, weakened 
condition. This is precisely the type of situation to which the higher legal causation test 
is intended to apply. The commission found that the evidence was inconclusive to 
show the force of the impact to Verburg's head was more than typically experienced in 
everyday life. The commission was not persuaded that Verburg's employment 
increased his risk of injury beyond the risk that is typically experienced in everyday, 
non-employment life. Rather, the commission concluded that the weight of the 
evidence in this matter shows that the incident on June 17, 2004 was typical of the type 
of insignificant insult commonly experienced in everyday non-employment life. 
Accordingly, Verburg's claim must fail. 
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Verburg argues that because the commission considered that there was no 
medical evidence of marks or bruising, as part of the legal causation analysis, that the 
commission improperly re-evaluated medical causation. It is appropriate for the 
commission to use common sense, life experience, and probability to evaluate the 
evidence to determine facts. The commission reviewed the entire record for evidence 
that would tend to support Verburg's claim and concluded that Verburg's complaint of a 
brief vision disturbance, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of legal 
causation. 
Verburg misapprehends the commission's duty to evaluate all of the evidence. 
The commission is required to consider all of the evidence presented that is relevant to 
the decisions it must make regarding workers' compensation claims. When there is no 
objective evidence to show the force of the exertion, the commission must review the 
record for evidence to support its findings. The commission simply looked to the 
medical records for additional objective evidence to support an award. The absence of 
bruising, contusion or even tenderness to palpation on the right side of the head all 
support the commission's conclusion that the force of impact was more ordinary than 
extraordinary. The commission correctly concluded that the petitioner presented 
insufficient evidence to prove legal causation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PETITIONER DID NOT PROVE LEGAL CAUSATION BY 
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
It is undisputed that Verburg brought a pre-existing weakened condition to work 
with him on June 17, 2004. It is undisputed that the event of June 17, 2004 was an 
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"accident" as that term is defined by Utah law2. It is also undisputed that Verburg's pre-
existing condition, degenerative cervical disc disease for which Verburg had recently 
received surgery, medically contributed to his increased complaints of neck pain after 
the accident of June 17, 2004. The only dispute between the parties to this appeal is 
whether the evidence shows that the head bump on June 17, 2004 involved a force 
great enough to satisfy the higher legal causation standard. If legal causation is 
proven, Utah law requires Ogden City to pay for all future medical expenses and wage 
loss related to Verburg's complaints of ongoing neck pain. 
Two elements are necessary to prove an injury by accident in the course and 
scope of employment under Utah's workers' compensation system. These are: (1) an 
injury by accident; and (2) proof of a causal connection between the injury and the 
employee's employment. In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the two part 
causation analysis promoted by Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation 
law. Allen at 22-23. 
In addition to adopting the now familiar two part analysis requiring evidence of 
medical and legal causation, the Court also clarified that the "standard to prove causal 
connection is preponderance of the evidence." Allen at 23, citing Lipman v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616,618 (Utah 1979). "To sustain this burden it is not enough to 
show a state of facts which is equally consistent with no right of compensation as it is 
with such a right. Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not sufficient to justify a 
2
 An "accident is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the 
cause or the result of an injury." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 
1986). 
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finding in the plaintiffs behalf" Hiqlevv Industrial Common, 285 P 306, 308 (Utah 
1930) 
The evidence presented in this matter shows that at 5 45 p m on June 17, 2004, 
Verburg slid into the seat of his patrol car to retrieve some items As he slid into the 
vehicle, he struck the right side of his head above the ear, on the doorframe He was 
not knocked unconscious and he was not knocked down He testified at the hearing on 
June 7, 2005, that his vision went black for a couple of seconds He reported no 
immediate onset of pain, but said that his neck later became stiff and sore 
There was no evidence presented at the hearing to show that Verburg was 
responding to an emergency situation or moving quickly at the time of the accident 
There was no evidence presented to show that the circumstances of Verburg's 
employment increased the risk of hitting hit his head or caused him to strike his head 
with more force than typically occurs when getting into a car and bumping one's head 
in everyday life The evidence does not establish that the blow was forceful 
Verburg did not immediately seek medical care or report an industrial accident to 
his employer The medical records of Dr Felix on June 29th and July 13th, Ogden Clinic 
on July 2nd and McKay-Dee Hospital Emergency Room on July 5th and 9th do not 
mention any observed swelling, tenderness or bruising at the site of the impact These 
initial medical reports from three different providers do not mention any history that 
Verburg's vision "went black" for a couple of seconds These medical reports only show 
that Verburg was complaining of increased pain at the back and left side of his neck 
after hitting his head 
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The ALJ reasoned that the force of the blow to Verburg's head exceeded the 
typical exertions of non-employment life because his vision went black for a moment. 
She also reasoned that the combination of his body weight and lateral movement 
increased the force of the blow to the side of his head, but failed to offer any rational 
explanation or reference to other evidence in the record to support her conclusion3. 
On Motion for Review, the Labor Commission was not convinced that Verburg's 
"testimony of his vision going dark is a measure of the force of impact," and concluded 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the exertion or force of impact involved 
in Verburg's accident was unusual or extraordinary in comparison to typical non-
employment life. 
Petitioner argues that there is ample evidence in the record from which the 
commission could find legal causation. Although Verburg argues that the significant 
force of the impact caused his vision to go black, there is no medical opinion in the 
record to support such an assumption. Verburg essentially asserts that a small scrap of 
self-serving evidence4 supported by a mere supposition that this evidence reflects a 
greater than typical force of the impact, is sufficient to prove legal causation. Even 
though the commission accepted Verburg's testimony at face value, the evidence does 
not compel the conclusion that Verburg's accident involved an unusual, atypical, 
3
 As Ogden City pointed out in the Motion for Review, the evidence did not show 
that the circumstances of Verburg's employment increased the force of the impact 
compared to a similar accident in typical non-employment life. 
4
 The only evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Verburg's vision 
actually did go black for a moment was his testimony and the statements he made to 
Dr. Pingree on August 13, 2004. He never reported this "symptom" to the medical 
providers he saw immediately after the accident. 
17 
forceful exertion. The evidence does not compel a conclusion that the accident was 
significant in any way. Although the evidence might be interpreted to show that Verburg 
hit his head with significant force, the evidence might also be interpreted to show, as 
the commission found, that Verburg had an abnormal reaction (complaints of 
significant pain) to a typical event (a bump on the head). Accordingly, the commission 
concluded that the evidence showed that Verburg's "injury" was more likely the result of 
his pre-existing condition. In order to prevail before this Court, Verburg must persuade 
the Court that the commission's application of the legal causation test is not reasonable 
or rational. Verburg has not demonstrated that the commission's interpretation of the 
evidence and application of the law to the facts is unreasonable or irrational. 
Verburg fails to acknowledge that the type of accident he experienced is a 
relatively common occurrence, and usually insignificant. The commission noted that it 
is not uncommon for people in typical non-employment life to hit their heads on 
doorframes, cabinets, or car trunks, and sustain no significant injury. Although these 
types of incidents don't occur everyday, they are nevertheless a common occurrence in 
everyday life. There is no frequency requirement to the objective standard applied in 
such cases. 
Among the examples of typical non-employment life provided in Allen, is 
changing a flat tire on an automobile. Although this is a "typical" activity, it rarely occurs 
in modern life more than once or twice a year, sometimes even less frequently. This 
typical activity is relatively strenuous. This task involves loosening lug nuts; lifting and 
carrying a wheel and tire; bending over or kneeling down to place the jack under the 
automobile; jacking the car; and tightening lug nuts. If this task is performed on the 
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side of the road, it would also involve watching out for errant motorists. This "typical" 
activity is actually rather strenuous. It is important that the Allen Court did not cite 
examples of typical activities like: sitting on the couch watching TV, or playing video 
games. It is clear that the Court intended to set the standard at a reasonable level to 
prevent the employer from becoming a general insurer of his employees. As the Court 
noted, the purpose of the higher legal causation standard is to "offset the preexisting 
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for 
impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work." Allen at 25. 
This Court recently reviewed the purpose of the legal causation requirement in 
Acosta v. Labor Commission:. 
[A]s stated by Professor Larson, 'the object is to distinguish work-
connected collapses from those that are due to normal progression of a 
disease." 2 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, LARSON'S WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION LAW§ 46.03[4], at 46-18 (2001). The underlying purpose 
served by making this distinction is to prevent awarding benefits where 
there is not "a sufficient causal connection between the disability and the 
working conditions." Allen, 729 p.2d at 25. 
Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67,U 23. 
As Justice Zimmerman noted: 
The sole question is whether the worker came to the 
workplace with a condition that increased his risk of injury. If 
he did, and that condition contributed to the injury, then 
Allen's higher standard of legal causation comes into play so 
as to place that worker on the same footing as one who did 
not come to work with a preexisting condition. To rule 
otherwise would create the strong likelihood that a worker 
who has a preexisting condition and whose virtually 
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at work will be able 
to foist the cost of that injury on his employer when the 
workplace had little to do with causing the injury. 
Hollowav v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, 
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J. concurring). Thus it is appropriate that Ogden City not be made Verburg's general 
insurer for his non-industrial neck condition. 
Verburg argues that because he hit his head and medically exacerbated his neck 
pain, he should receive benefits for his pre-existing degenerative neck problems. 
However, he has not shown that his work contributed anything to increase his risk of 
injury from bumping his head. Rather, he suffered an atypical reaction to a typical 
activity. Verburg cites examples of slipping while carrying a garbage can or being 
injured when a jack slips while changing a tire and argues that these examples are 
similar to the exertions of his accident and would be compensable. However, the 
compensability of these examples, like the compensability of Verburg's accident 
depends on the totality of the evidence surrounding the accident. The example of 
slipping while carrying a trash can would satisfy legal causation only if the trash can 
was sufficiently heavy and the other circumstances reveal unusual or extraordinary 
exertions. If the employee fell to the ground while carrying the trash can, legal 
causation would clearly be satisfied. Similarly, the slipping jack could satisfy the higher 
legal causation standard depending on the specific exertions involved in the accident. 
If the car falls off the jack and lands on the petitioner, legal causation is met. If the car 
falls and the employee jumps out of the way, the analysis is less certain and would 
depend on the existence of additional facts to support a finding of causation. 
Had Verburg proved that his work contributed something substantial to increase 
his risk of injury, the commission would have awarded benefits. However, the evidence 
simply did not show that Verburg's head bump was significant. Verburg wasn't knocked 
out; he wasn't knocked down; he didn't have immediate pain or dysfunction and he 
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didn't seek immediate medical care. In short, he provided no evidence other than his 
testimony that his vision briefly went black to show that the stress and strain he 
experienced on June 17, 2004 was more than the stress and strain of typical non-
employment life. The commission has the duty to analyze all of the evidence 
presented to determine whether the evidence supports the claim. In this case, 
petitioner did not provide much evidence for the commission to review to evaluate his 
claim. When the evidence can reasonably lead to different conclusions, the 
commission is entitled to interpret the evidence as it sees fit, so long as the 
commission's interpretation of the evidence is reasonable. 
Petitioner confuses the requirement for an "injury by accident" with the 
requirement to prove "causation." The commission carefully reviewed the record for 
sufficient evidence to show that Verburg's employment provided something substantial 
to increase his risk of injury. However, there was only one piece of evidence to support 
a finding of increased risk related to the employment; a brief vision disturbance. The 
commission was unconvinced that this evidence alone was enough to support an award 
of benefits. Given that there was no other evidence to support a finding that the impact 
in this matter was in any way greater than a typical, everyday bump on the head, the 
commission's decision is supported by the evidence in the record and should not be 
disturbed. 
II. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY REVIEWED ALL OF THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO CORRECTLY APPLY 
THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
Verburg asserts that the commission should award him benefits because he 
sustained an unusually forceful blow to the head while getting into his patrol car after 
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work to retrieve his belongings. The only evidence he presented to show the force of 
the blow was his testimony that his vision went black for a second. The commission 
was unconvinced that Verburg's report of briefly darkened vision supported a 
conclusion of an unusually forceful impact. Accordingly, the commission reviewed the 
rest of the evidence in the record to determine whether there was any additional 
evidence that would support a finding that Verburg's blow to the head was more than a 
routine, typical bump to the head. The commission found no additional supportive 
evidence and, because the vision symptom offered by Verburg was unpersuasive as to 
the force of the head bump, denied Verburg's claim. 
Petitioner complains that the commission improperly reconsidered medical 
causation because it noted the "absence of any evidence of bruising or other marks 
from the impact,5" that would support the conclusion that Verburg sustained more than 
a typical head bump on June 17, 2004. This argument is incredible. The burden to 
prove medical causation is typically rather low. The claimant merely has to provide a 
doctor's report stating that his accident medically caused his injury or medically 
aggravated his pre-existing condition. Medical causation is typically based on the 
doctor's evaluation of the history of the injury, which is provided by the injured worker 
and the doctor's medical knowledge about mechanisms of injury. 
Medical causation does not require a showing that the injury was more likely to 
have occurred at work than anywhere else. Rather, it is legal causation that is 
designed to address that aspect of causation. Legal causation compares the injured 
5R. (Vol. 1)at61. 
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worker's specific, workplace exertions to an objective, non-employment life standard, to 
determine whether the injury is the result of the pre-existing condition or the 
employment related exertion. Given that these two separate causation analyses 
address different aspects of the causal relationship, it is appropriate and reasonable 
that the commission considered whether the evidence showed that Verburg had bruises 
or contusions after the accident. Common life experience tells us that bruises typically 
result from a significant impact. The lack of evidence of bruising is simply one factor 
that the commission considered to determine legal causation. 
The commission explained: 
The Commission has reviewed the evidentiary record in this 
matter with particular attention to the accident that occurred 
as Mr. Verburg was getting into his car. Based on the 
evidence, the Commission reaffirms its finding that Mr. 
Verburg experienced a relatively routine event in which he 
bumped his head as he slid into the driver's seat. The fact 
that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that 
event-his vision "going black" for a moment-does not 
change the nature or force of the impact itself, but is more 
reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's preexisting cervical 
problems6. 
Verburg admits that he did not see a doctor immediately after the accident of 
June 17, 2004. He argues that any marks or bruising would likely have decreased or 
disappeared by the time he did see a doctor. The fact that Verburg did not see a doctor 
immediately or even within a couple of days argues against the blow having been 
significant. Verburg recently had fusion surgery. He claims that he was concerned 
about a non-union of his fusion. Such concerns would cause many patients to seek 
6R. (Vol. 1)at80. 
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immediate medical care. The fact that Verburg did not seek medical attention near the 
time of the accident supports the commission's conclusion that the bump was a "typical" 
one. 
Verburg argues that "none of the medical records reflected any absence of 
bruising or other marks and there was no other evidence in the records concerning the 
existence or non-existence of such items." Pet. Br. at 29. Verburg asserts that the 
commission's conclusion that there was no evidence of bruising is unsupported. 
Review of the medical records in this matter clearly shows that none of the medical 
providers mentioned the presence of bruising or marks on the right side of Verburg's 
head after the June 17, 2004 accident. Further, Verburg did not testify that he suffered 
bruises or other marks after the accident. It is reasonable to expect that the medical 
providers who saw Verburg looked for evidence of bruising or swelling when he sought 
care. Although the Emergency Room physicians who examined Verburg noted that his 
neck was tender to palpation and ecchymotic. They mention no symptoms on the side 
of his head. Accordingly, the commission's observation that there is no evidence in the 
record to show any bruising or other marks is correct. This observation is not an 
improper assumption, as Verburg claims, but rather, a correct interpretation of the 
evidence presented in this matter. 
Similarly, the medical histories recorded by the physicians Verburg saw in June 
and July 2004 do not indicate that he ever reported to them that his vision briefly went 
black. He saw four different providers after the June 17th incident and none of their 
records indicate that he struck his head forcefully against the doorframe; that his vision 
"went black;" or that he had any bruising or discoloration as a result of the blow. The 
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only evidence Verburg presented to show that the force of the impact on June 17th was 
forceful, was his testimony that his vision briefly "went black." There is no medical 
opinion in the record to support the conclusion that this vision complaint is medical 
evidence of a significant blow to the head. It is Verburg's burden to prove that the 
accident legally caused an industrial aggravation of his pre-existing condition; he simply 
has not provided sufficient evidence to prove his claim. Although there is no dispute 
that there is a medical causal connection between the head bump and Verburg's 
reported increase in neck pain, he cannot prevail in this matter without evidence to 
prove legal causation. 
The Labor Commission and its Administrative Law Judges must use their 
common sense and life experience to determine whether the theories of the case 
presented by the parties are natural, probable, reasonable, plausible and easy to 
believe. The commission may not simply provide "a talismanic incantation" finding that 
there was "unusual or extraordinary exertion," as a substitute for careful analysis of the 
evidentiary record. See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1083 
(Utah 1986). When the only evidence presented to support a finding of legal causation 
is not persuasive and there is no other evidence in the record to reasonably support a 
finding of legal causation, the commission should deny the claim. Workers' 
compensation is not intended to make the employer a general insurer of its employees. 
This is precisely the reason that the Supreme Court adopted the legal causation 
requirement. 
It is Verburg's burden as the petitioner, to prove legal causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. To prove his case, Verburg must point to some 
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convincing, persuasive evidence in the record to prove that his accident is the legal 
cause of his injury. Under the circumstances of this case, he needed to provide 
evidence that the blow was forceful enough to increase his risk of injury over the risk of 
injury he faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition. Verburg simply 
failed to meet his burden to prove legal causation. Therefore, the commission's 
decision in this matter should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he was injured by accident in the course and scope of his employment 
with respondent. Where, as here, the petitioner brought an element of personal risk of 
injury to the workplace, he must show that the exertions of his employment substantially 
increased his risk of injury. The evidence presented in this matter showed that Verburg 
was simply getting into an automobile and coincidentally bumped the side of his head. 
This is exactly the type of incident to which the higher legal causation requirement is 
intended to apply to protect employers from becoming general insurers of their 
employees. 
Therefore, the Labor Commission correctly concluded that the preponderance of 
the evidence in the record does not show that the accident of June 17, 2004 involved 
exertions sufficient to satisfy the higher legal causation standard under Allen. 
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Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the Labor Commission which denied 
workers' compensation benefits in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of June, 2008. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
{JA^nX TAr<tfst<\ 
Sharon J. Eblen, Attorneys for 
Respondent Ogden^-City Police Department 
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